> . . . by preventing them from carrying weapons onto those planes. Yes? So, going back to my original questions, if the screenings are security theater, according to your definition, they should be 100% ineffective at that job without any attempt at circumvention.
This is wrong on several levels: first, it ignores the fact that security screenings existed prior to the establishment of the TSA. So the TSA screenings could have no value for actual security without being 100% ineffective, if they were no more effective than the preexisting screenings.
And second, because something can be security theater and still have some positive effect on security, if that positive effect is both not its primary motivation and not remotely warranted by the cost.
Security theater doesn't mean that there is no gain in security, it means that the security function is pretextual and any security effect is incidental.
This is wrong on several levels: first, it ignores the fact that security screenings existed prior to the establishment of the TSA. So the TSA screenings could have no value for actual security without being 100% ineffective, if they were no more effective than the preexisting screenings.
And second, because something can be security theater and still have some positive effect on security, if that positive effect is both not its primary motivation and not remotely warranted by the cost.
Security theater doesn't mean that there is no gain in security, it means that the security function is pretextual and any security effect is incidental.